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Patterns of Democracy - Coalition Governance and Majoritarian Modification  
in the United Kingdom, 2010-15 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical 
antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe.  Yet, in recent years a different 
account has emerged that focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics which limit the 
executive.  It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent 
chapter of coalition government within the wider context of ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛdemocratic evolution.  
To do so, the article draws >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a 
refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time.  The article demonstrates 
that between over the course of the 2010-15 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of 
majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the 
constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition 
management.  The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and 
beyond.  Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship 
between institutional design and democratic performance.  Methodologically, it demonstrates 
that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate within-
case analysis.  Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the 
h< ?ƐĞǆƚĂŶƚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽďĞ
subject.   
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***** 
 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) has been regarded as the archetype of majoritarianism, characterised by a power-
hoarding executive that dominates the legislature and wider polity; and within the comparative literature, 
British government is often portrayed as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western 
Europe (e.g. Powell, 2000; Lijphart, 2012). Yet, in recent years a different account of ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛdemocratic 
credentials has emerged which focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics that serve to limit the executive, 
and which are often neglected by macro-level comparative accounts.  Such studies include the accretion of 
functions by select committees (e.g. Benton and Russell, 2013; Matthews and Flinders, 2015); the 
increasingly combative character of the House of Lords (e.g. Russell, 2013); and the rise in judicial 
independence (e.g. Norton, 2013; Hazell, 2015).  Other scholars have analysed the effects of the dispersal of 
executive power to devolved assemblies throughout the UK (e.g. Dunleavey and Margetts, 2001; Cairney, 
2008); and to depoliticised bodies such as the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) (e.g. 
Flinders and Buller, 2006; Diamond, 2015).  Indeed, focusing on the net effect of such changes, it has been 
argued that under the previous Labour governments of 1997-2010, the UK has embarked on a process of 
 ‘ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?ĂƐ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ-ƐŚĂ ŝŶŐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ǁĞƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŽƵƌƐŽĨǁŚĂƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
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a power-ŚŽĂƌĚŝŶŐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?&ůŝŶĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
It is to this body of scholarship that this makes an important and timely contribution, locating the recent 
chapter of coalition government within the wider story of ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛdemocratic evolution.  The constitutional 
journey on which Labour embarked in 1997 lacked both a roadmap and a final destination, resulting in a 
myriad of constitutional obstacles that its successor would be required to navigate.  Yet, whilst the 2010 
election offered a window of opportunity for a new government to instill a much-needed degree of 
constitutional coherency, the process of coalition formation brought together two parties with radically 
divergent constitutional philosophies (Matthews, 2015).  Moreover, that the electoral system failed to 
produce to produce a clear winner underscored the extent to which the normative assumptions of 
Westminster majoritarianism had been compromised; and throughout the 2010-15 parliament, the 
realpolitik of coalition management served to exacerbate many of these pre-existing tensions.  Set in a 
comparative perspective, this episode also provides further evidence of a wider shift from the extremes of 
majoritarianism and consensus taking place in countries worldwide (Vatter et al, 2014).   
 
To substantiate this argument, the article draws on the two-dimensional typology of democracies developed 
by Lijphart (2012).  Initially developed to facilitate cross-national comparison, >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛframework has been 
successfully applied to a number of individual country settings, including the UK (Flinders, 2010); and by 
adopting a similar lens, this article extends this analysis to the previously uncharted terrain of coalition at 
Westminster.  In doing so, it makes several specific contributions to existing scholarship.  Theoretically, it 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌĞũŽŝŶĚĞƌƚŽ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?and challenges his argument that the UK has become 
more majoritarian (2012, pp. 10-20).  Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale 
comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate within-case analysis.  Empirically, it provides a series 
of conclusions regarding the tenability of ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĞǆƚĂŶƚdemocratic architecture under the weight of 
pressures to which it continues to be subject.  In order to develop these arguments, the article is divided into 
three sections. The first section provides an ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ and the insights it 
affords regarding the state of British democracy, whilst positing a number of alternative proxies to facilitate a 
finer-grained analysis.  The second section applies this revised framework to the 2010-15 parliament, and in 
doing so captures the underpinning dynamics of change. The final section locates this research within the 
broader contours of democratic and constitutional change in the UK.  It demonstrates the changes wrought 
under the Coalition ĞǆĐĞĞĚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ďŝ-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?&ůŝŶĚers, 2010) that had hitherto developed, revealing 
an apparent ƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? ƚŽ  ‘tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?  ?,ĂǌĞůů ?  ? ? ? ? ?. 
Moreover, it underlines how many of these changes were unanticipated and unintended, which has 
precipitated a series of critical tensions that contemporary governments will be required to manage. 
 
 
1. Patterns of democracy and their underlying visions  
 
The performance of democratic institutions is a core concern of comparative political science.  Within this 
scholarship, the corpus of work by Arend Lijphart has attracted such widespread attention that  ‘ŝƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
ƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ? ?ƵůƐĂƌĂĂŶĚ<ŝƐƐĂŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
172). The essence of >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞǀŽůƵŵĞƐ ?most recently 2012), is that 
democracies can be placed on a continuum that has majoritarianism at one extreme and consensualism at 
the other.  In broad terms, in the majoritarian model political power is concentrated, exclusive and has little 
emphasis on public participation.  The consensus model, by contrast, emphasises the inclusive, deliberative 
sharing of power and public engagement with the political process.  dŽ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ Ă ƉŽůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ  ‘ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ? ŽĨ
democracy, Lijphart develops an analytical framework involving two dimensions  W  ‘Ğxecutives-ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?and 
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 ‘federal-ƵŶŝƚĂƌǇ ?  W which each contain five variables, as set out in table 1.  Using the proxies detailed, a 
country is scored against each variable, and these scores are then aggregated to locate cases on a two-
ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂů ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵĂƉŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?ĂƐƐŚŽǁŶŝŶĨŝŐƵƌĞ ? ? 
 
 
***Table 1 here*** 
 
***Figure 1 here*** 
 
 
 
As a starting point for systematic analysis, >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚǇƉŽůŽŐǇprovides a replicable framework and a 
commonly-understood vocabulary that can be used to facilitate both comparative analysis.  It has also been 
successfully applied to a number individual country settings including Ireland (Bulsara and Kissane, 2009), 
Canada (Studlar and Christensen, 2006) and Switzerland (Vatter, 2007).  When applied to the UK, however, a 
ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĞŵĞƌŐĞƐ ?ǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŽ ? ? ? ? >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛown analysis reinforces the caricature of 
the UK as the prototypical power-hoarding democracy, suggesting that between 1945-1981 and 1981-2010 
there was a decisive shift towards the right of the map (figure 1 above).  Yet this conclusion remains in sharp 
contrast with a number of academic analyses that sought to emphasise the increased diffusion of political 
power and disaggregation of constitutional norms.  Between 1997- ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ
raft of institutional developments, including the dispersal of power to the devolved assemblies established by 
the the Government of Wales Act 1998, Northern Ireland Act 1998, Scotland Act 1998, and Greater London 
Authority Act 1999; the enshrinement of the European Convention on Human Rights via the Human Rights 
Act 1998; the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000; and the creation of the Supreme Court in 
2009 via the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  The forces unleashed by these rapidly instigated reforms were 
regarded by some as amounting to a constitutional upheaval.  Glover and Hazell, for example, described this 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ĂƐ ŽŶĞŽĨ  ‘ƋƵŝƚĞ ĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?   ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ĂŶĚBogdanor argued ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ
most striking quality of the new constitution is its startling and radical discontinuity with the old ? cutting 
ƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŽƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ?3, 291).  Others were more circumspect. ĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂƐ
 ‘Ă ŵĞƐƐ ?ŽĨ  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚďŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ? <ŝŶŐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽ  ‘ĞǆƉŽƵŶĚ ĂŶĚ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ǁŚŽůĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƉƉ ?  ? ? ?-1).  In a similar vein, Gamble stated ƚŚĂƚ  ‘[i]n 
>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵƚŽĚĂǇŝƐůĞƐƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐƚĂŶĚůĞƐƐƵŶŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĂŶŝƚǁĂƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚ ŝƐƐƚŝůůĂůŽŶŐ
way from a political system that is truly federal and decentralized ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĞĐŚŽĞĚďǇ Flinders 
(2010), who highlighted the one-sided ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ĂƐthe transfer of governing competencies 
to devolved ĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ďŝ-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂů ƉŽǁĞƌ-
sharing model was imposed on the sub-national level, whilst an attachment to the norms and institutions of 
power-hoarding was maintained at the national level. 
 
 
Nonetheless, whilst the overall impact remains contested, it is clear that >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞheralded a 
critical period of constitutional and democratic change.  It is also clear that >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽ
account for these changes, as the process of generalising over a relatively long timeframe (1981-2010) served 
to distort or conceal the profound shifts that occurred during this ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ƐƚŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŵĂǇ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ  ‘Ă ŵĂũŽƌ ďƌĞĂŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝǌŝŶŐ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ ? 
(Bormann, 2010, p. 9), it is not a panacea for the challenges of democratic analysis.  A number of specific 
criticisms have been made regarding the selection of variables, the relevance of proxies and the 
impressionistic use of evidence (e.g. Mainwaring, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002; Siaroff, 2003; Taagepera, 2003; 
Bormann, 2010; Ganghof, 2010; Jordan and Cairney, 2013).  More broadly, it has been argued that the 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂů ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂǇ  ‘ŵŝƐƐthe significance of culture and 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?  ?,ĂǌĞůů ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ĨŝǆĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽŶŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶs between government and non-
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government parliamentarians neglects ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŽĐĐƵƌƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ĞǆƚƌĂ-
parliamentary arenas (Jordan and Cairney, 2013, p. 236, 245).  Yet ? ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐ ŽĨ >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ
framework is its adaptability, and a number of studies have demonstrated the way in which the framework 
can be refined to increase its analytical purchase (e.g. Nagel, 2000; Kaiser et al, 2002; Vatter, 2007; Bulsara 
and Kissane, 2009; Vatter and Bernauer, 2009).  It is this vein that this article proceeds, employing a 
Lijphartian framework to compare the degree and direction of democratic change under the Coalition with 
that which occurred under the Labour governments of 1997-2010.  It is apparent ƚŚĂƚ  ‘much change goes 
unnoticed ŝĨƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ? ?:ŽƌĚĂŶĂŶĚĂŝƌŶĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?
and this focused comparison is intended to ameliorate the distortions in which the aggregation of 
observations can result.   Moreover, a systematic assessment of the 2010-15 parliament is significant and 
timely.  As indicated above, >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƉŝĞĐĞŵĞĂů ƌĞĨŽƌŵ  ‘ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? created a range of 
constitutional pressures that any incoming government would be required to manage.  Yet, not only did the 
2010 hung parliament witness the first coalition since 1945, but one comprised of partners with a high level 
of divergence over constitutional issues (Matthews, 2015).  A detailed analysis of this period is therefore 
demanded; and the 2010-15 parliament provides critical insights regarding the extent to which an 
 ‘ƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ďǇ Ă ŶĞǁ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
settlement (Hazell, 2008, p. 297).   
 
 
However, the process of scaling-down Lijpharƚ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ to a single parliament serves to magnify the flaws 
in several of the proxies used; and refinement is required to facilitate analysis that effectively travels 
between temporal scales.  The relevance of cabinet type and duration as measures of cabinet inclusivity (V2) 
and executive-legislative relations (V3) have been queried (Mainwaring, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002; Ganghof, 
2010); and these two proxies in particular offer limited purchase when applied to a single observation.  That 
the Coalition was minimal winning (V2) and lasted for its full five-year term (V3) is self-evident; and the 
comparison with the single party majority Labour governments (V2) of 1997-2010 (V3) fails to reveal any 
meaningful underlining trend.  Moreover, in neither instance do the proxies illuminate intra-government 
dynamics or the balance of power between government and parliament.  To overcome these weaknesses, 
this article adopts alternative proxies for V2 and V3. To assess the inclusivity of the cabinet (V2) ? EĂŐĞů ?Ɛ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ŝƐ ĂƉƉů ĞĚ; and this articles focuses on votes and 
seats in order distinguishing between the extent to which executive power is shared within the legislature 
and the extent to which it is proportionally distributed in accordance with electoral support.  To assess the 
dynamics of executive-legislative relationships (V3), this article focuses on the degree of influence exercised 
by non-cabinet parties; and adopts the index of  ‘opportunity for opposition influence ? proposed by Powell 
(2000, pp. 103-9), which ranges from a low of 0.1 (opposition parties facing majority government and the 
absence of legislative committees) to a high of 0.75 (opposition parties facing minority government and the 
presence of strong legislative committees). This approach is further supported by the introduction of a 
complementary measure of the party system (V1).  tŚŝůƐƚ >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ƐŽůĞůǇŽŶĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ƐŚĂƌĞŽĨ
seats owing to the effect upon cabinet formation, the inevitable distortions in which an electoral system 
results (as measured in V4) masks the dynamics of party competition on the ground.  To account for this, this 
article applies the Laakso-dĂĂŐĞƉĞƌĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽďŽƚŚƚŚĞshare of 
seats and votes won by each party.   
 
 
As this article seeks to locate the recent episode of coalition government within its broader context, these 
new measures will be applied to the 2010-15 parliament and to all previous observations (following Lijphart 
(2012, p. xvi) a single observation runs from the date of a national election to the eve of the next election, i.e. 
the duration of an entire parliament).  The overall results are presented in table 2.  The final two columns 
depict the degree of change which occurred under the Coalition; and then the overall degree of change that 
has occurred since 1997.  They also depicts the direction of change, indicating whether against the variable in 
question the UK has become more majoritarian ( ‘A? ?), or less ( ‘- ‘ ?.  The presentation of individual variables in a 
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tabular format, rather than an aggregated conceptual map, is intended to overcome criticism regarding the 
equal weighting given to each variable ŝŶ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐƚǇƉŽůŽŐǇ (e.g. Jordan and Cairney, 2013, pp. 245-6); and in 
doing so creates the space for a degree of expert judgment that can be absent when relying on operational 
measures (Taagepera, 2003, p. 10).  More broadly, the handling of the data in this way, along with the 
accompanying qualitative analysis of each variable, is intended to respond ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ŝŶ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ĨŽŽƚƐƚĞƉƐ ? try to disentangle the intricate relationship between culture and political 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŐĂŝŶĂĚĞĞƉĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞƚǁŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ŽƌŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?  It 
is to this analysis that the next section turns. 
 
***Table 2 here*** 
 
 
2.  Coalition governance and majoritarian modification 
 
 
The executives-parties dimension 
 
 V1ʹ Party system 
 
Whilst the electoral stranglehold of the two main parties has waned since 1974, the distortions of the 
election system resulted in a series of outright victories for the Conservatives (1979, 1983, 1987, 1992) and 
Labour (1997, 2001, 2005), prompting some scholars to regard the party system of 1979-2005 as one of 
 ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŶŐƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?e.g. Quinn, 2012).  Yet, recent elections have witnessed the burgeoning impact 
of  ‘other ? parties upon the dispersal of parliamentary seats; and this pattern was unequivocally confirmed in 
2010 as the effective number of parties returned to the House of Commons stood at 2.58, reflecting the finer 
balance of seats between the two main parties and the  ‘king-ŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƌŽůĞaccorded to the Liberal Democrats.  
Moreover, this record high only partially reflected longer-term shifts within the party system.  The 2010 
general election witnessed the share of vote accorded to the two main parties plunge to a then-low 67.6 
percent; and it is evident that the logic of the simple plurality electoral system has masked a burgeoning 
multi-party system in terms of votes cast.  Indeed, the dispersal of votes cast in 2010 revealed that 3.72 
parties were effectively present on the ground, which therefore confirmed the longer-term trend towards 
increasingly multi-party competition that has gathered pace since the election of 1992.  This trend has been 
driven by the weakening of traditional electoral cleavages and the rise in issue-based voting, which has 
increased ƚŚĞǀŽƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ?ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚĂůůŽǁŝŶŐrelative newcomers such as 
the Green Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) to gain prominence.  The rapid ascent of the latter 
became a critical theme throughout 2010-15.  In the 2010 general election UKIP were the fourth most 
popular party, although with only 3.1 percent of the UK-wide vote, failed to gain a single MP.  Undeterred, 
ƚŚŝƐ ‘ƌĞǀŽůƚŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?gathered momentum as the party connected ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘more insecure and precarious 
working class, which feels its concerns have been written out of the political debate ? (Goodwin and Ford, 
2014).  By August 2014, the party had come second in seven of the sixteen by-elections held, in several 
instances with a share of the vote exceeding 20 percent.  Later that year, UKIP secured its first MPs with the 
resignation of two Conservative MPs (Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless) who then successfully stood for 
UKIP in the subsequent by-elections.  Moreover, in the 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP received 
the largest share of votes (26.6 percent) and seats (24 of 73).  
 
 
 V2 ʹ Cabinets 
 
Whilst the result of 2010 election was inconclusive, the ensuing negotiations resulted in a minimal winning 
coalition of two parties whose combined vote basis constituted a majority.  Shifting the UK away from 
 ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ƉůƵƌĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?  ?EĂŐĞů ?  ? ? ? ? ?, the Coalition occupied a majority of seats in the House (55.9 
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percent), and represented a majority of voters on the ground (59.1 percent).  Whether this afforded the 
Coalition a popular mandate is moot, reflecting normative debates regarding the desirability of the pre-
election identifiability and the defensibility of post-election coalition chicanery (for an overview, see Powell, 
2000, pp. 69-88).  In the run-up to the 2010 election, the topic of coalition focused exclusively on Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats, and few foresaw the coming together of two parties with seemingly little shared 
ground or experience (although see Bale, 2011 for a retrospective mea culpa).  Few also anticipated the 
ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐůŽŶŐĞǀŝƚǇ: in a poll taken days after the Coalition was formed, only 28 percent of those surveyed 
thought it would last 12 months and 90 percent believed it would not last the full term.
1
   
 
Whilst this longevity can be contributed to a wide range of factors, it was undoubtedly supported by the 
adaptation of the  ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶǁŝƌŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇ ?1996) of the constitution to the demands coalition governance.  
As anticipated by theories of coalition formation (e.g. Budge and Keman 1990), ministerial positions at all 
levels of government were allocated on a near-proportional basis with the Deputy Prime Minister holding the 
right to veto re-shuffles.  Alongside this ? Ă ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ǀĂůǀĞƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ Programme for 
Government, with provisos for the relaxation of collective responsibility around contentious issues including 
university tuition fees and electoral reform; and the Ministerial Code was revised to allow collective 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ƌĞůĂǆĞĚ  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƐĞƚ ĂƐŝĚĞ ?  ?ĂďŝŶĞƚ KĨĨŝĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?3). The ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
stability also rested on a rational acceptance of the transitory nature of the deal.  Throughout 2010-15, both 
parties frequently reaffirmed the pragmatic nature of their relationship; and during the long campaign of 
2015 general election, each sought to distinguish itself in terms of ideology and policy in a manner that 
strained the bonds of collective responƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶŝƚǇ-distincƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ?that often 
confronts coalitions at the end of their life-cycle (Boston and Bullock, 2009).  The extent to which the 
experience of coalition promoted a more consensual sharing of executive power is therefore unclear.  There 
is little evidence to suggest that the experience of governing in partnership fostered a sustained culture of 
co-operation and inclusivity.  Indeed, as the term progressed, relationships between the two parties became 
increasingly fractious, with inter-party divisions laid bare via the national press. Nonetheless, the adaptation 
of processes of government to the exigencies of coalition demonstrated an important degree of institutional 
responsiveness. 
 
 
 V3 ʹ Executive-legislative relationships 
 
To assess the dynamics of the relationship between the executive and the legislature, it is important to 
consider both the powers enjoyed by its legislative committees and the wider influence of the plenary 
session (Powell, 2000, pp. 103-9).  In terms of tŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?WŽǁĞůůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂĐůĞĂƌ
majority, however achieved, ƚŚĞƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ůŽǁ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐŝŐŶƐĂƐĐŽƌĞŽĨ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ?  W 
emphasis added).  Certainly, the the plenary session provides opposition parties with few formal mechanisms 
to directly affect policy; ĂŶĚŝŶŽŶĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ  ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůŽƌƚŽƚĂůůǇ ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?
(King and Crewe, 2013, p. 361).  Nonetheless, there is a burgeoning body of scholarship that provides a more 
nuanced accoƵŶƚŽĨWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶŝƚƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂĨĨĞĐƚƉŽůŝĐǇon both the public stage and 
behind-the-scenes.  In particular, these studies underline the ways in which the House of Commons exercises 
 ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ďǇĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƚŽĨĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ZƵƐƐĞůůĂŶĚŽǁůĞǇ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐŽ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐ ƚŚĞ
ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽǁĞƌ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? &ůŝŶĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ <ĞůƐŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?In addition, evidence suggests that the 
challenges of parliamentary management experienced by the Coalition were qualitatively different to those 
experienced by their single-party predecessors. The dispersal of ministerial posts across the two parties, for 
                                                        
1
 https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Pol-Suntopical-100513.pdf, last accessed 7 
March 2016. 
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example, fuelled disappointment amongst the significant number of Conservative MPs who had anticipated 
ministerial appointment (Evans, 2012); whilst backbenchers across both parties resented their leaders for 
entering into a coalition with their political opponents and for conceding the policy grounds necessary to 
foster a workable coalition agreement. Unsurprisingly, the 2010-15 parliament was the most rebellious since 
1945 with the analysis of Cowley and Stuart (2014) revealing that 52 percent of Conservative MPs and 72 
percent of Liberal Democrat MPs had rebelled.   
  
In terms of the second aspect of opposition influence, a distinction is made between strong committees with 
chairs equally shared amongst all large parties (score = 0.25); and, either strong committees chaired by 
government parties or weak committees with shared chairs (score = 0.125).  There is unfortunate tendency 
within comparative scholarship to neglect the impact of select committees (e.g. Mattson and Strøm, 1995, p. 
260); and numerous studies have demonstrated the increasing impact of select committees on government 
policy (e.g. Hindmoor et al, 2009; Benton and Russell, 2013).  In recent years, committees have enjoyed an 
ongoing accrual ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŚĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?  ?,  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?); and under the 
Coalition a further shift occurred as a series of important changes were instigated, including the introduction 
of elections for committee chairs, the creation of the Backbench Business Committee and the establishment 
of a public e-petitions system.  These reforms were part of a package proposed by the Wright Committee, 
convened by Labour in 2009 to  ‘ƌĞďƵŝůĚ ƚŚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ? (HC 1117, 2009).  Although constituting only a partial 
fulfillment of ƚŚĞŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ pledge to implement Wright ?Ɛ recommendations in full (the commitment to a 
House Business Committee was sidelined), such reforms have bolstered the capacity of select committees; 
ĂŶĚǁŚŝůƐƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂůŽŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽĂ ‘ŶĞǁĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ
ĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?  ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ĨŽƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? dŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ĐŚĂŝƌĞůĞĐƚions in particular has 
ďĞĞŶƐĞĞŶĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĨŽƌ ‘Őŝǀ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŽƐĞĐŚŽƐĞŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ?wresting from 
the party whips an important resource of intra-party control.  Overall, therefore, the cumulative impact of 
2010-15 was to further shift the balance of power towards the legislature, increasing aggregate score on the 
 ‘ŝŶĚĞǆ ŽĨ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? from 2.25 to 3.5, driven by the significant reforms to 
appointment of select committee chairs, and the concomitant effect upon the behavior of members. 
 
 
 V4 ʹ Electoral systems 
 
The aggregate effect of the h< ?Ɛ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů system has been to over-reward the plurality winner with 
parliamentary seats.  For proponents of majoritarianism, this is normatively defensible in terms of strong and 
responsible government.  Yet, as discussed above (V2) ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĨĞǁ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?
government in the UK (the Coalition being the first government to represent a majority of voters since 1935). 
Unsurprisingly, the UK ranks highly in terms of disproportionality on a comparative basis.  The UK received a 
score of 14.66 on the Gallagher index for the period 1971-96; and the return of three successive Labour 
governments with majorities that far exceeded their vote share pushed the average score up to 16.98 for the 
period 1997-2010.  Following the 2010 general election, the score stood at 15.08; and whilst this remains 
whilst high in comparative terms, in relative terms it signalled an apparent reversal of previous trends.  
Nonetheless, the gulf between votes cast and seats won has been grist to the mill of electoral reform 
proponents.  With a long-standing commitment to proportional representation, electoral reform was a 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů  ‘ƌĞĚ ůŝŶĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐduring coalition negotiations. Yet, despite advocating the single 
transferrable vote, the Liberal Democrats ultimately accepted the Conservative ?Ɛ offer of the legislation 
required to hold a referendum on the alternative vote (a decidedly non-proportional electoral system).  This 
concession was further limited as collective responsibility was suspended to allow each party to campaign 
freely during the subsequent referendum campaign.  Indeed, during the campaign, the two largest parties 
remained committed to the status quo; as the Labour Party adopted no official party position and the 
Conservatives were vociferously opposed to change. This reflects what Judge (1993) described as the 
 ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞexecutive ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ĨŽƌ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů Ɖarties to 
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support reforms that could reduce their power by encouraging a more competitive party system (V1), in turn 
increasing the likelihood of multi-party coalitions (V2), and therefore making it more difficult to control the 
legislature (V3). Moreover, the lack of popular support for electoral reform (67.9 percent of voters rejected 
AV in the referendum of 2011) assured the short-term future of ƚŚŝƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŵĞga 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?, despite its failure in 2010 to deliver against its underpinning majoritarian objectives. 
 
  
V5 ʹ Interest groups 
 
Notwithstanding the corporatist experiments during the 1970s, interest group engagement in the UK has 
remained at the pluralist end of ^ŝĂƌŽĨĨ ?Ɛ (1999) eight-point index.  Indeed, despite Labour ?Ɛhistoric 
association with the trade unions, between 1997-2010 it remained committed to maintaining the patterns of 
engagement inherited from previous Conservative governments.  Under the Coalition, a similar pattern 
persisted.  There is little evidence to suggest that the Government brought organised interest groups into 
policy-making through structured and coordinated channels.  Moreover, the declining presence of organised 
labour in British public life persisted throughout 2010-15.  Trade union membership has been in sharp 
decline since its peak in 1979, when over 13m members of the workforce belonged to a union; and despite 
the economic pressures faced by employees since the recession, it fell to a low of 6.4m by 2014 (Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2015, p. 5).  Indeed, by 2014 only 25.0% of the workforce were union 
members, the lowest rate recorded since 1995.   The overarching context of austerity ensured that unions 
remained relatively active throughout 2010-15, an average of 647,200 working days per year being being lost 
(peaking in 2011 at 1.4 million working days), with the overwhelming majority of stoppages relating to wage 
disputes
2
.  Yet, reflecting the dwindling membership base, this translated into a mere 23.2 lost working days 
per 1,000 workers; and it was also evident during this period that public support for union activity waned, 
despite widely experienced pressures resulting from public sector cuts and the rising cost of living.  Only 37 
percent of people supported the large-scale public sector strikes of September 2012; and only 27 percent of 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ hŶŝƚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ >ĞŶ DĐůƵƐŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂůů ŝŶ Ɖƌŝů  ? ? ? ? ĨŽƌ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƐƚƌŝŬĞ  ? ? ? ?
(YouGov/The Sun, 26 April 2013).  Reflecting these trends, the index yields a score of 3.625 for the period, 
which represents a slight shift towards the pluralist end of the index.  
 
 
The federal-unitary dimension 
 
 V6 ʹ Division of power 
 
Prior to 1997, the UK was regarded as being one of the most centralised democracies in the world.   In this 
context, the devolutionary reforms enacted by the Labour governments were significant in terms of 
loosening the ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?Ɛ ŐƌĂƐƉ ŽŶ ƉŽǁĞƌ; pushing the UK towards what Flinders described as a system of 
 ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-federalism ? (2010, p. 182; see also Gamble, 2006), occupying an interim position between >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘semi-federalism ? (score = 3) and a  ‘unitary and decentralised ? state (score = 2).  Under the 
Coalition, this agenda was incrementally extended.  The Scotland Act 2012 equipped the Scottish Parliament 
with additional financial and legislative powers; and the Wales Act 2014 gave the National Assembly limited 
tax raising powers whilst clarifying some of its procedures.  The Coalition revisited the issue of local 
devolution.  In May 2012, referenda were held in eleven English cities on issue of directly elected mayors; 
and in November 2012 voters throughout England and Wales were given an opportunity to elect local Police 
and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).  In both instances, public enthusiasm was muted: only one city (Bristol) 
supported a directly elected mayor; and only 15.1 percent of the electorate turned out to vote in the PCC 
elections.  Finally, Coalition pledged to  ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞŶĚƚŚĞ
era of top-down governŵĞŶƚ ? ?,D'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?11); and statutory provisions were made under the 
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http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/workplacedisputesandworkingconditions/articles/labourdispu
tes/2015-07-16, accessed 29 June 2016. 
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Local Government Act 2011.  Nonetheless, the significant ĐƵƚƐ ŝŶ ůŽĐĂů ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ďƵĚŐĞƚƐreduced their 
practical capacity to utilise their new powers (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). 
 
 
The ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƋƵĞůůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ; and in 2011, the SNP were returned to 
Holyrood with an outright majority and the determination to hold a referendum on Scottish independence.  
The signing of Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012 paved the way for a referendum on 18 September 
2014. The three main Westminster parties were clear in their opposition to independence.  However, in the 
last few days of the campaign a poll that placed support for independence at 51 percent sent shockwaves 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞƚƚĞƌ dŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ĐĂŵƉ; and within 48 hours a joint pledge was made to transfer additional 
powers to Scotland, in a package described by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown as being  ‘ĂƐĐůŽƐĞ ƚŽ
federalism as you can have in a nation where one part forms 85 percent ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?.  Whilst the extent 
to which  ‘dŚĞsŽǁ ? affected the subsequent result is unknown, the referendum witnessed a record turnout 
(84.6 percent), and a narrow rejection of independence by 55 to 45 percent.  The Smith Commission was duly 
established on 19 September 2014, and reporting twelve months later, it recommended the transfer of 
significant competencies including the freedom to set income tax rates and bands; increased borrowing 
powers; and control over a number of social benefits.  In January 2015, the Coalition announced its 
acceptance of these recommendations in full, pledging to implement them during the 2015-20 parliament 
(Cm. 8990, 2015).  This breakneck pace prompted serious concerns regarding the coherency and 
sustainability of  ‘ĚĞǀŽ-ŵĂǆ ?.  The Political and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, for example, criticised 
ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ  ‘examination of the overall 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞh<ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ W apart from the consideration of legislation  W for the 
UK Parliament to assess the overall ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŽŶƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ^ĞĞĂlso HL 
145, 2015).  Nonetheless, with fundamental decisions regarding the future of the Union postponed until after 
the general election, the record of the 2010-15 parliament is one of ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ŽĨĨƐĞƚ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
reform; and the score of 2.5 continues to reflect the division of power under the Coalition.  
 
 
 V7 ʹ Parliaments and congresses 
 
The extent to which the UK enjoys a meaningful degree of bicameralism has been contested.  Describing the 
ƚŚĞ >ŽƌĚƐ ĂƐ  ‘Ă ƌĞůŝĐ ŽĨ Ă ƉƌĞ-ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ĞƌĂ ? ?Lijphart ascribed the UK a score 2.5 ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶĚĞǆ ŽĨ
ďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŚŽǀĞƌŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁĞĂŬ ? (2010, p. 201).  Similarly, the abolition of hereditary 
peers in 1999  W without the coterminous introduction of an elected element  W was seen by Flinders to 
weaken the Lords further, downgrading its score to 1.75 (2005, p. 81).  Yet such arguments have been 
challenged, notably by Russell, whose in-depth analysis leads her to assert that the House of Lords Act 1999 
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ  ‘Ă ƌĞǀŝǀĂů ŽĨ ďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵ Ăƚ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ  ?ƚŚĂƚ ? ďƌŝŶŐƐ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ĐůŽƐĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŵŽĚĞů ? 
(2013, p. 293).  The wealth of evidence accumulated by Russell demonstrates the significant increase in 
government defeats since 1999, as the removal of the hereditary peers has left a chamber where no single 
party dominates, and where votes are increasingly issue-based and closely fought.  Far from leaving the Lords 
in limbo, the reforms that commenced under Labour actually served to legitimise and embolden, and a score 
of 3.0 (ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐĐĂƚĞƌŐŽƌǇŽĨ ‘medium strength bicameralism with asymmetrical and incongruent 
chambers ?) is instead ascribed for 1997-2010. 
 
 
This pattern of bicameralism persisted during 2010-15. The Programme for Government contained a 
commitment to  ‘bring forward proposals for a wholly or mainly elected upper chamber on the basis of 
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?,D'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ, 2010, p. 27).  Although the ensuing House of Lords Reform 
Bill 2012 was quickly withdrawn following widespread Conservative opposition the backbenches (again 
underlining the anticipatory influence of the Commons, discussed in relation to V3), members of the Lords 
remained willing to assert their autonomy.  Whilst ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĂƚĞŽĨ ĚĞĨĞĂƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ >ŽƌĚƐǁĂƐ
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lower than that experienced by the last Labour Government (19.8 percent per annum versus 35.0 percent 
per annum), it suffered significant defeats on many of its key (and most controversial) policies, including the 
Welfare Reform Bill in January 2012, the Health and Social Care Bill in February 2012, and the Banking Reform 
Bill in November 2013.  Moreover, and despite the numerical advantage of the Coalition in the upper 
chamber, party blocs became less cohesive and the votes of cross-benchers more decisive.  Whereas for 
1999-2010 only 30 percent of divisions in the Lords saw a rebellion by a government backbench peer; in the 
first two years of the Coalition this increased to over 55 percent (Russell, 2013, pp. 115-120).  More 
generally, this period witnessed greater involvement by peers in the life of the House and between 2007-8 
and 2012-13, daily attendance increased by 17 percent; voting activity increased by 55 percent; Questions for 
Short Debates increased by 63 percent; and Questions for Written Answers by 15 percent.
3
  The contrast 
between the ostensibly weak bicameral structures and the increasingly robust bicameral culture is a clear 
example of the  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐŵŝƐŵĂƚĐŚ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇĞǆŝƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘constitutional ĨŽƌŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘constitutional ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?
(Bulsara and Kissane, 2009, p. 191); and reiterates the necessity of expert discretion in the application of 
evaluative indices.  Taken together, the evidence here suggests that ongoing activism of the Lords during 
2010-15 complemented the resurgence of parliamentarianism in the lower house; and the chamber can 
again be given a score of 3.0  
 
 
 V8 ʹ Constitutions: Amendment Procedures  
 
Famously uncodified and with a constitutional culture predicated on parliamentary sovereignty, it is 
unsurprising that the UK scored 1.0 on the index of  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? throughout 1945-2010. 
Parliament enjoyed few formal limits on its capacity to instigate change, underlined by way in which Labour 
implemented critical constitutional reforms in quick succession on the basis of a simple majority.  During 
2010-15 this flexibility was subject to a degree of circumscription.  The passage of the Fixed-Term 
Parliaments Act 2011 brought with it the requirement of a two-thirds majority approval for the early 
dissolution of Parliament, and thus introduced a formal constraint on this previously unfettered prerogative 
power of the Prime Minister.  Whilst a super-majority is a constitutional first, it is in relation to only one 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ; and therefore a score of 1.5 reflects the flexibility of 
the constitution between 2010-15.  This period also witnessed ĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĐƌĞĞƉ ?.  In February 
 ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞŶ WƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ 'ŽƌĚŽŶ ƌŽǁŶ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ Ă ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ  ‘ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƵŶǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ?
piecemeal conventions that govern much of the way central governments operates ? into a single written 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?  ?cited in IPPR, 2011, p. 12).  This document became the Cabinet Manual, published in October 
2010.  Although Sir Gus K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?ƚŚĞŶĂďŝŶĞƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?stressed that the MĂŶƵĂůǁĂƐ ‘not intended to be 
legally binding or to set iƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƐƚŽŶĞ ? ?Ăbinet Office, 2011, p. iv); the Political and Constitutional Reform 
Select Committee suggested that its very existence risks its elevation to constitutional status (HC 734, 2011, 
p. 41).  Thus, as Bogdanor argued,  ‘ŝŶĂŶƵŶƉůĂŶŶĞĚĂŶĚunfŽƌĞƐĞĞŶǁĂǇ ?the Manual, drawn up to meet a 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĞǆŝŐĞŶĐǇ ? ŵŝŐŚƚ ǁĞůů ƉƌŽǀĞ ? Ă ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂŐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐĨorming a constitution 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ “ƚĂĐŝƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ŝŶƚŽŽŶĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ?2011, p. 24).  
 
 V9 ʹ Judicial Review 
 
Between 1945-96, Britain scored 1.0 on the index of judicial review; and despite signing the European 
Convention of Human Rights (EHCR) in 1950, and ceding sovereignty to the institutions of European 
Community in 1973, the UK was still widely regarĚĞĚ ĂƐ ĞŶũŽǇŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ?'ƌŝĨĨŝƚŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ?.  
Under Labour, a series of changes were introduced with the potential to shift the balance, as the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) incorporated the ECHR into domestic law; and the creation of the Supreme Court in 
2009 via the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 led to a formal separation of powers.  Nonetheless, these 
developments were predicated on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty; and Flinders suggested that 
                                                        
3 http://www.libdemvoice.org/house-of-lords-only-slightly-larger-but-much-more-active-35729.html, last accessed 26 June 2014. 
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ĂŶǇƐŚŝĨƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ŽĨĨƐĞƚƚŽĂůĂƌŐĞĞǆƚĞŶƚďǇĂũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ŝŶ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?suggesting an index score of 1.5 to reflect this 
ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ĐŚange (2010, p. 250).    
 
Of the 29 declarations of incompatibility issued to date under the HRA, only three were made during 2010-
15, perceived ďǇ :ŽŝŶƚ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ŽŶ ,ƵŵĂŶ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐůǇ ƐŵĂůů ŶƵŵďĞƌ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐ [a] 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƚƌĞŶĚ ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?  Nonetheless, several declarations have led to significant 
policy changes, and there is evidence that the HRA has entailed an anticipatory effect, as governments have 
refrained from bringing forward legislation that may be deemed incompatible (Bellamy, 2011; Hiebert, 2012; 
Norton, 2013; Hazell, 2015). There is also evidence that the HRA has enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, in 
particular that the Joint Committee on Human Rights hĂƐ ‘ŬĞ ?Ɖƚ ? ŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶŝƚƐƚŽĞƐ ? by getting the 
Government to be more transparent in its thinking about important human rights issues ? (Kavanagh, 2015, p. 
124; see also Campbell et al, 2011; Norton, 2013; c.f. Hiebert, 2012).  Yet the way in which the HRA attempts 
to reconcile the competing dynamics of parliamentary sovereignty and right-based constitutional review has 
engendered tensions regarding the appropriate balance.  In opposition, David Cameron announced that a 
Conservative government would replace the HRA with a  ‘British Bill of Rights ?, ƚŽĞŶĂďůĞ  ‘a common-sense 
ďĂůĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŝǀŝůůŝďĞƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?.  Governing with the Liberal Democrats 
(who supported a written judicable constitution) necessitated compromise, and a commission was 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ  ‘to investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on all our 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ?,Z ? ? ?,D'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? Reporting in December 2012, the Commission 
on a Bill of Rights failed to reach a consensus, its report detailing the fundamental divisions that existed.  
Many Conservatives remained vociferously opposed to the HRA; and in 2014 the Prime Minister promised 
that  ‘with a Conservative Government after the next election, this country will have a new British Bill of 
Rights, to be passed in our Parliament, rooted in our values ?.  Nonetheless, and despite the fact that the 
formal powers of the courts changed little between 2010-15, the anticipatory effect of the HRA served 
encouraged a more juridified legislative culture, and the capacity of the courts to set aside legislation had a 
greater impact on government behaviour than initially anticipated.  A score of 2.0 is therefore ascribed to 
reflect the weak, yet burgeoning, system of judicial review and cultural shift in which it has resulted. 
 
 
 V10 ʹ Central banks 
 
In 1997, Labour granted the Bank of England operational independence, freeing it to set interest rates with 
reference to ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ŽĨ  ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ.  Under the Coalition, the Bank of England 
continued to enjoy its independence; and in 2013 was granted additional ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŽ  ‘us[e] intermediate 
thresholds in order to influence expectations on the future ƉĂƚŚ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ƌĂƚĞƐ ?4.  The Coalition further 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?Ɛpurview, and the Financial Services Act 2012 established an independent Financial Policy 
Committee to act as a macro-prudential regulator, overseeing the financial system as a whole. This period 
also witnessed effective limits on the execuƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞŐovernor.  The Financial Services Act 
2012 resulted in a change of tenure, with the Governor being appointed for a single term of eight years 
rather than a maximum of two five-year terms.  Moreover, Parliament sought to increase its oversight of this 
key appointment.  In 2011 the Treasury Committee recommended that to safeguard the independence of the 
gŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŐŝǀĞŶ ‘ĂƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌŽĨǀĞƚŽŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵent and dismissal of the Governor 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŶŬ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇgranted in relation to the Chair of the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (HC 874, para. 148). Despite the Government ?Ɛ rejection of this recommendation (Cm. 8268, 
2012), Mark Carney elected to appear before the Committee before assuming the governorship; and in 
February 2013 gave evidence in an unprecedented event that effectively constituted a pre-appointment 
                                                        
4
 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget2013_statement.htm, last accessed 27 June 2014. 
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hearing. In publishing its recommendations, the Committee annŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ǁ ?Ğǁŝůů ĨŽůůŽǁĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉƌĞ-
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ?  ?,  ? ? ?, 2013); and although such 
vettings were (and remain ?ƌĞƐŝƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ŵ ?8628, 2012), 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĂĐĐƌƵĂůŽĨ ‘ǁĂƚĐŚĚŽŐ ?ƉŽǁĞƌƐďǇƐĞůĞĐƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů
appointments (Matthews and Flinders, 2015).  dŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ Ă ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞŵŝƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
degree of insulation of its CEO from political interference are key factors in the indices of Grilli et al (1991) 
and Cukierman et al (1992); and evidence demonstrates a further increase ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂŶŬ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
independence during 2010-15, raising the index score to 0.67. 
 
 
3.  Concluding discussion: democratic drift and the danger of disengagement 
 
 
Through a refined application of >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ typology of democratic forms, this article has evaluated the degree 
and direction of democratic change in the UK between 2010-15. Overall, it has demonstrated that during the 
2010-15 parliament, the UK moved further away from the caricature of a power-hoarding polity, as power 
became more diffuse and the executive more constrained.  Yet whereas Flinders (2010) identified a pattern 
of bi-constitutionality, this article has instead underlined the bi-directionality ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ
evolution, as changes have occurred in relation to both the executives-parties dimension and the federal-
unitary dimension.  EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? &ůŝŶĚĞƌƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ĚƌŝĨƚ ?remains apt.  Like their Labour 
predecessors, the Coalition failed to offer a coherent vision of the democracy it sought to achieve.  Governing 
in partnerships entails compromise and with the two parties holding fundamentally opposed constitutional 
philosophies, it was unsurprising that the Programme for Government was heavy on rhetoric but moderate in 
scope (Matthews, 2015).  Of those reforms pursued, several failed to capture the public imagination, such as 
electoral reform (V4) and the introduction of directly elected mayors (V6); fell victim to inter-party 
politicking, such as the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012 (V7); or were diluted in execution, such as the 
implementation of ƚŚĞtƌŝŐŚƚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨƵůů ?s ? ? ?At the same time, the Coalition 
was constrained by external forces.  This was most vividly illustrated by the way in which ^EW ?Ɛ ŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚ
majority in Holyrood rendered an independence referendum as politically unavoidable, which in turn acted 
as a catalyst for a commitment to  ‘ĚĞǀŽ-ŵĂǆ ?and its attendant implications (V6).  Moreover, it became clear 
that reforms enacted by Labour had created alternative sites of legitimacy, as reflected in an emboldened 
House of Lords (V7) and an increasingly juridified legislative culture (V9).   
 
 
>ŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ, a number of broad 
conclusions can be drawn.  As discussed above, scholars (e.g. King, 2007; Hazell, 2008; Bogdanor, 2009; 
Flinders, 2010) had been divided regarding ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ; and in the immediate 
aftermath of these reforms, such uncertainty was somewhat inevitable.  As Glover and Hazell explained,  ‘the 
initial reforms set in train a series of consequential changes, and there is a lot of dynamism still working its 
ǁĂǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?  ?2008, p. 4).  The 2010-15 parliament made clear that the changes wrought by 
Labour have been embedded in ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůsettlement.  NŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ
ongoing hostility to the HRA, the Coalition did not seek a repatriation of powers to Westminster, and many of 
its constitutional reforms sought to further extend the logic of decentralisation.  The 2010-15 parliament also 
witnessed the manifestation of the unintended consequences of >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ‘ĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?  ?ŽŐĚĂŶŽƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ?, in particular the SNP ?ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ of the Scottish Parliament and the 
concomitant growth of nationalist sentiment. In hindsight, it may seem inevitable that devolution would 
provide the institutional and political conditions for nationalism to flourish.  Indeed, comparative research 
clearly ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘the opportunities [decentralisation] provides regional parties to win elections in 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?enables such ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ? ƐĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐŵ ďǇ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ďĂƐĞĚ ĞƚŚŝĐ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?(Brancati, 2006, pp. 652-3).  Yet thĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵŽĨƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐǁŚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
ǁŝůů ůŽŽƐĞŶďƵƚŶŽƚďƌĞĂŬƚŚĞďŽŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ?,ĂǌĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?; see also King, 2007) pre-
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dated the return of an SNP majority in 2011 whose constitutional and policy platform was entirely at odds 
with that of the government at Westminster; and the inter-governmental dynamics that developed during 
2010-15 provided fertile ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ?(Glover and Hazell, 2008, p. 4) of 
devolution to be dramatically played out.  Moreover, tŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞits knock-on at 
Westminster, such as  ‘ŶŐůŝƐŚǀŽƚĞƐĨŽƌŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁƐ ? ?served to reiterate the lack of  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? of 
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŐĞŶĚĂ (Bogdanor, 2009, p. 271; see also King, 2008, p. 351). 
 
 
 
At the same time, the way in which the Coalition sought to manage the  ‘ŵĞƚĂ-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŝƐƐƵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
electoral reform and Scottish independence further entrenched ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-by-ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?
(Matthews, 2015, p. 329) that developed at the sub-national level under Labour.  Scholars have divided 
regarding the constitutional status of referenda.  Whereas McLean argues  ‘ǇŽƵ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ
believe wŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚůǇŝŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚďĞůŝĞǀĞǁŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚůǇŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
p. 191); Bodganor suggests ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ? ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŵĂǇ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƌŬ ‘ŵŽƌĞƐŵŽŽƚŚůǇ ?ďǇ ‘ĚĞĨƵƐ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?/Ŷboth
referenda ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞĚǁŝůů ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞǁĂƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚĂƐďŝŶĚŝŶŐ ?Clause 8 of the Parliamentary Voting 
and Constituencies Act 2011 compelled the introduction of AV if supported by a majority; and by signing the 
Edinburgh Agreement in 2012, ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ĂĐĐĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ Ă ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘deliver a fair test and 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶ ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ǁŝůů ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?.  On both 
occasions the CoaůŝƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? side, which avoided the two sources of sovereignty being 
brought into conflict.  Nonetheless, the frequency of referenda held by the Coalition (who also held a 
referendum in Wales on further devolution in 2011; and in 12 English cities on directly elected mayors in 
2012) has fuelled popular expectations ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐ ?
should be subject to public approval; and that governments will exercise a self-denying ordinance if the 
 ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞĚǁŝůů ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞǁĞƌĞĂƚŽĚĚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ? 
 
 
The evidence presented in this article therefore demonstrates that over the course of 2010-15 parliament an 
increasing gap emerged between constitutional  ‘form ? and constitutional  ‘practice ? (Bulsara and Kissane, 
2009).  In particular, it ŚĂƐ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŬĞǇ  ‘ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ? ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
parliamentary sovereignty upon governing elites, whilst also drawing attention to the unforeseen 
consequences of reforms intended to preserve such principles, and the constitutional tensions that result.  In 
ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞh< ?s constitutional and democratic journey, the ongoing dispersal of power and the emergence 
ŽĨ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ Ă ůĞŐĂů ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?(Hazell, 2008, p. 
295) as bearing little relevance to constitutional practice.  Indeed, the experience of 2010-15 suggests an 
apparent trajectory towards ĂƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? (Hazell, 2008, p. 295).  
Yet, forecasts are fraught with difficulty (see Glover and Hazell, 2008); and in the context of Brexit, the UK ?Ɛ
constitutional future is set to be subject to profound deliberation.  The ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŚĂƚƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
future in Europe has prompted fierce debate regarding the sovereignty of parliament versus that of the 
people, as reflected by demands for a parliamentary vote to formally trigger of Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  Moreover, the state of the union is also under threat as Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the SNP, has 
raised the possibility of a second independence referendum due to ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?  ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ǀŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ŽĨthe UK remaining in the EU by 62 percent to 38 percent) and the 
 ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĐŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚ ? 
 
 
 
The unfolding ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƌĞǆŝƚ ǁŝůů ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
settlement.  Yet, even without this additional dimension, the current parliament presents a series of 
constitutional challenges to be carefully navigated.  Perhaps the greatest source of pressure emanates from 
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the most fundamental ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ ‘ŵĞƚĂ-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?: the electoral system itself.  The 2015 general 
election saw the SNP being returned as third largest party in the House with 56 seats.  With a UK-wide share 
of the vote of just 4.7 percent, first-past-the-post significantly over-rewarded the party for its geographic 
strength.  Indeed (and despite the fact that the SNP was supported by 50.0 percent of voters in Scotland), if 
Gallagher index of disproportionality is applied to Scotland alone, the score for 2015 stands at 61.37!  The 
parliamentary success of the SNP stands in sharp contrast with that of UKIP, who received just one MP for its 
12.7 percent share of the vote; and the Greens, whose 3.8 percent share also returned just one MP. The 
increasing gulf between votes and seats means that Westminster democracy is failing against its own 
majoritarian terms, as the wider pattern is of governments that represent a declining minority of voters.  
Electoral reform is the most powerful tool at the disposal of executives to affect the democratic character of 
a polity (see, for example, Powell, 2000; Carey and Hix, 2011), and yet successive governments have shied 
away from instigating changes that would be likely to increase party competition and policy compromise 
(Matthews, 2015, p. 331).  Although this is politically rational in the short-term, as the disparity between 
votes and seats grows, so to will the long-term implications for the legitimacy of the system.  The burgeoning 
body of research on the crisis of democracy (e.g. della Porta 2014) underlines a clear relationship between 
democratic change and public trust in political institutions.  Yet within the UK, the ongoing drift away from 
majoritarianism has not closed the gap between the governors and the governed; and swathes of society 
such as the young and the poor have become increasingly disengaged from traditional mechanisms of 
representative politics.  Set against this wider context, the challenge for the current Government is to not 
only address constitutional incoherency that has previously burgeoned, but to do so in a way that reconnects 
the disenfranchised within a more deliberative political process. 
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dĂďůĞ ? ?>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?ƐŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ 
Dimension  Variable 
 
Majoritarian Consensus Proxy measurement 
  
E
x
e
cu
ti
v
e
s-
p
a
rt
ie
s 
V1. Party system 
 
Two party system. Multi-party system. Laakso-dĂĂŐƉĞƌĂ ‘effective number of parties ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
applied to share of seats in legislature. 
 
 
V2. Cabinets Single party majority cabinets. Power-sharing multi-party coalitions. Mean of: a) percentage of time for minimal-winning 
cabinets; and, b) percentage of time for one-party cabinets 
(mean) 
 
V3. Executive-
legislative 
relationships 
 
Dominant, power-hoarding 
executive. 
Balance of power between executive 
and 
Average cabinet duration in years. 
V4. Electoral systems 
 
Disproportionality via a simple 
plurality election system. 
 
 
Proportionality via a PR electoral 
system. 
 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
V5. Interest groups 
 
Informal pluralist interest group 
interaction. 
 
 
Co-ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝƐƚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
group interaction. 
^ŝĂƌŽĨĨ ‘index of interest group pluralism ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
  
F
e
d
e
ra
l-
U
n
it
a
ry
 
V6. Division of power Unitary and centralised 
government. 
 
 
Federal and decentralised government Index of federalism, running from 1 (unitary and centralized) 
to 5 (federal and decentralised). 
 
V7. Parliaments and 
congresses 
 
Concentration of power in a 
unicameral legislature. 
 
 
Division of power between two 
equally strong but differently 
constituted houses. 
Index of bicameralism, running from 1 (unicameralism) to 4 
(two powerful chambers elected on a different basis.  
V8. Constitutions 
 
Flexible constitution that can be 
amended by simple majorities. 
 
 
Rigid constitutions that can be only be 
changed by super-majorities. 
 
Index of constitutional flexibility, running from 1 (can be 
amended by simple majority) to 4 (can only be changed by 
super-majorities). 
V9. Judicial review 
 
Legislature has the final word on 
the constitutionality of legislation. 
Legislation subject to a judicial review 
of their constitutionality by a supreme 
court. 
 
Index of strength of judicial review, running from 1 (none) to 
4 (strong). 
V10. Central Banks 
 
 
 
Dependent on the executive. 
 
 
Independent of the executive. Mean of the following indices of central bank independence: 
a) Cuckierman-Webb-Neyapti (1994); and, b) Grilli-
Masciandaro-Tabellini (1991).  
 19 
Figure 1.  Shifts on the two-dimensional map of democracy from the period 1945-81 to the period 1981-2010 
 
 
Source: Lijphart, 2012, p. 251. 
 20 
Table 2. Democratic change in the UK, 1945-2015 
Variable Proxy measurement Average, 
1945-96* 
 
Average, 
1971-96* 
Labour 
Government, 
1997-2010** 
Coalition 
Government, 
2010-15 
Change between 
1997-2010 and 
2010-15 
 
Overall change 
since 1997 *** 
V1. Party 
system 
Laakso-dĂĂŐƉĞƌĂ ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽĂ ?
share of seats in legislature; b) share of votes cast in general 
elections 
 
a) 2.11 
b) 2.69 
 
a) 2.20 
b) 3.06 
a) 2.25 
b) 3.38 
 
a) 2.58 
b) 3.72 
a) -0.33 
b) -0.34 
a) -0.14 
b) -0.41 
 
V2. Cabinets  
 
Popular cabinet support (Nagel, 2000), measured by a) seat share of 
cabinet parties; b) vote share of cabinet parties. 
 
 
a) 54.1 
b) 44.7 
a) 53.6 
b) 41.2 
a) 60.4 
b) 39.7 
a) 55.9 
b) 59.1 
a) +4.5 
b) -19.4 
a) -5.7 
b) -3.4 
V3. Executive-
legislative 
relationships 
 
WŽǁĞůů ‘ŝŶĚĞǆ of opportunity for opposition influence ? ?2000), 
running from 0.1 (weak opposition and no legislative committees) 
to 0.75 (strong opposition and strong legislative committees) 
 
0.16 0.25 0.225 0.35 -0.125 -0.09 
V4. Electoral 
systems  
 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 10.33 
 
 
14.66 16.98 
 
 
15.08 
 
 
-1.9 
 
+1.85 
V5. Interest 
groups  
 
^ŝĂƌŽĨĨ ‘ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŐƌŽƵƉƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
3.38 3.5 3.5 3.625 +0.125 +0.125 
V6. Division of 
power 
Index of federalism, running from 1 (unitary and centralized) to 5 
(federal and decentralised). 
 
1.0 1.0 2.5 2.5 0 -1.5 
V7. Parliaments 
and congresses  
Index of bicameralism, running from 1 (unicameralism) to 4 (two 
powerful chambers elected on a different basis.  
 
2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 0 -0.5 
V8. 
Constitutions  
 
Index of constitutional flexibility, running from 1 (can be amended 
by simple majority) to 4 (can only be changed by super-majorities). 
 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 
V9. Judicial 
review 
 
Index of strength of judicial review, running from 1 (none) to 4 
(strong). 
 
1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 -0.25 -0.75 
V10. Central 
banks 
Mean of the following indices of central bank independence: a) 
Cuckierman-Webb-Neyapti (1994); and, b) Grilli-Masciandaro-
Tabellini (1991).  
 
0.31 0.28 0.59 0.67 -0.08 -0.39 
1. Partially derived from: *Lijphart, 1999; **Flinders, 2010. 
2. *** Compared against average position for 1971-96.  For variables 1-4, overall change between 1971-6 and 1997-2015 is based on the mean of four observations for the latter 
period (i.e. the outcomes of the general elections of 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010). 
3. Increase in ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵĚĞŶŽƚĞĚďǇ ‘A? ? ?ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŝŶŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƐŚŝĨƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ĚĞŶŽƚĞĚďǇ ‘- ‘
